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Abstract
Many studies have explored Colombia’s peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia – guerrilla group (2012–2016). Conflict negotiation literature indicates that the impact of
leadership is particularly relevant to peace processes as leaders have to find a balance between war
and peace. Still, little is known about the political leaders in charge. This study deals with the
development of a political leader’s leadership in peace initiatives. It uses an in-depth case study of
Colombia’s former President Juan Manuel Santos combining leadership and conflict negotiation
literature to trace back the origins of his leadership. Santos, a controversial figure, represented
a policy of reconciliation to negotiate with the opponents while also appearing tough in order to
maintain his political base. Between hawk and dove, he initiated and signed the peace negotiation and
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016. I adopt a personal biography approach using bio-
graphical data to explore the origins of Santos’ beliefs and values, his competence and skills and the
way others perceived him. Linking this leadership-centred argument with findings from the conflict
negotiation suggests that a pragmatic and reconciliation-oriented leadership might be relevant to
find solutions to protracted conflicts like the one in Colombia. Most importantly, it contributes to
a significant claim: Leaders have at least some level of choice and their biographical factors are
relevant for political outcomes.
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“[…] you can in a way say [I am] an undercover dove with the head of a hawk, but [only] if you are
defining a dove as someone who wants peace.” (Santos Calderón, 2018)
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Introduction
Much has been written about why leaders go to war (Fearon, 1995; Horowitz et al., 2015), but there
is still a need to fully understand why they initiate peace processes. This is especially relevant for
seemingly intractable conflicts like that of Colombia, a country that has been entangled in a bitter
struggle between the government and different guerrilla movements for over half a century (Deas,
2015). Conflict negotiation literature indicates that in order to be capable of initiating a peace
process, the political leaders in charge have to represent a policy of recognition, and even rec-
onciliation, to negotiate with the opponents; on the other side, they have to appear tough to maintain
their political base who often struggles to accept that the government makes political concessions
(Gormley-Heenan, 2001; Stedman, 1997; Zartman, 2001). Among other factors, the impact of
leadership seems particularly relevant to peace processes because leaders have to find a balance
between war and peace. It is key to ask: ‘Where does this type of leadership in which a political
leader is capable of combining policies of recognition with a certain type of toughness to initiate
a peace process come from?’
This study deals with the development of a political leader’s capacity for leadership in peace
initiatives. It uses an in-depth case study of a very controversial figure combining leadership and
conflict negotiation literature to trace back the origins of leadership. The dependent variable is policy
related to the initiation of peace negotiations; it does not analyse the eventual success or failure of
such a policy. Political leaders often hesitate to initiate a peace process perceiving them as cost
intensive, ambiguous and risky (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 159–163; Westlake, 2000). However, this
has not been the Colombian experience, as all Colombian presidents since 1978 have sought peace
with the guerrillas – and failed. In 2012, after months of secret talks, Colombia’s president, Juan
Manuel Santos (2010–2018) initiated a peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), signing an agreement in 2016 and winning the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts
(Pizarro Leongómez, 2017). This article adopts the recently developed personal biography approach
(Krcmaric et al., 2020) to study Santos’ biography, creating a new perspective on leadership for
peace processes. It uses biographical data to demonstrate how Santos developed a pragmatic and
reconciliation-oriented leadership, defined here as the bridging of toughness and reconciliation.
Santos has often been called an opportunist – even though it is debatable whether any political leader
can actually be successful without opportunism. For the present study, I prefer the term ‘pragmatic’,
understood as the capacity to maintain followers through appearing strong and making decisions
which increase political power.
In this study, I aim to make two contributions: firstly, the analysis is important for understanding
how a leadership for peace process may develop. For the Colombian peace process specifically, it is
relevant to grasp how a controversial leader could successfully initiate a peace process being, inter
alia, called a traitor, a hawk, a chess player and a chameleon. Secondly, it has significant implications
for Leadership studies in general, as it aims to explore leadership for the initiation of peace processes
by looking at Santos’ role. The analysis provides a better understanding of the extent to which
political leaders may be able to improve the likeliness that peaceful solutions to armed conflicts are
initiated. As suggested by scholars of international relations, heads of states facing the prospect of
peace in an armed conflict can endanger the process by misjudging and rejecting information or by
not acting and reacting in an appropriate manner (Arnson, 2007; Aronoff, 2014; Jervis, 1976;
Larson, 1997; Walch, 2016). Moreover, Leadership studies benefit from an early application of
a new research method to study leaders – the personal biography approach, which has not been used
with qualitative sources.
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By looking at the development of Santos’ leadership style, I build on a growing body of interest in
the ways in which leaders’ characteristics and experiences shape decisions about peace (Kertzer
et al., 2020; Yarhi-Milo et al., 2018). Thus, this study contributes to a significant claim: leaders have
at least some level of choice and their biographical factors are relevant for political outcomes.
The study proceeds as follows: firstly, the article gives some background information on the
Colombian armed conflict before it discusses the existing approaches for understanding the de-
velopment of Santos’ leadership. Then, I discuss the personal biography approach and the methods
to explore the link between Santos’ biographical factors and political outcomes. In the core analysis,
the personal biography approach will be combined with the literature on leadership in peace ne-
gotiations: The first step of the approach is to look at Santos’ beliefs and values, then his competence
and skills, and lastly, others’ perceptions of his leadership. Ultimately, this study sheds light on the
role of leadership for peace processes elsewhere through analysing Santos’ biographical factors.
The Colombian armed conflict and its peace processes
For our understanding of Santos’ leadership, as a man who was born in 1951, it is relevant to give an
introduction into Colombia’s internal armed conflict from 1948 to 2010. In 1948, the clash between
the conservative and liberal parties sparked into a conflict known as La Violencia. Colombia also
experienced a short period of military rule (1953–1957). Between 1958 and 1974 conservatives and
liberals agreed to share power, alternating mandates every 4 years. During that period Colombia’s
leftist guerrilla groups emerged: The FARC, a Marxist–Leninist guerrilla rooted in peasant or-
ganisations, was founded in 1964. Their main aim was to carry out a socialist revolution influenced
by other countries like Cuba. In reaction to the left-wing insurgencies, paramilitary forces emerged
in many parts of the country. Parallel to the conflict, the drug trade increased from the 1970s
onwards, and by the early 1980s, there was a complex mosaic of actors, including the famous
Medellı́n and Cali cartels. In the 1980s, drug cartels began to join forces with counter-insurgency
groups, and the number of paramilitary groups also multiplied (Kalulambi Pongo, 2003; Romero
et al., 2007). Both the guerrilla groups and the paramilitaries benefitted from the drug trade.
For this analysis, the last two governments before Santos are of particular importance because
they laid the foundation for his peace process with the FARC: President Andrés Pastrana (1998–
2002) initiated a peace process with the FARC in 1999. Soon the so-called ‘Caguán peace process’
turned into a political disaster for Pastrana as he was considered to have been naive, offering
a ceasefire with almost no conditions on the FARC, believing they would cooperate while actually
they were rearming and increasing their power (Pizarro Leongómez, 2017: 370). Still, Pastrana
initiated and implemented Plan Colombia in 1999, a US-led foreign aid, military and diplomatic
initiative aimed at ending the armed conflict by increasing funding and training of the army and
reducing the cocaine trade through anti-drug trafficking operations. Plan Colombia significantly
amplified the army’s military capacity (Granada, 1999: 594–596; Palacios, 2012: 172–174). In
comparison to Pastrana, who had desperately tried to make peace with the FARC, President Álvaro
Uribe (2002–2010) ran as an independent candidate who positioned himself as a strong leader, not
going soft on the FARC (Bermúdez, 2010). During Uribe’s administrations, the official position was
that there was no internal armed conflict, but rather a ‘terrorist threat’. By changing the discourse,
Uribe created an atmosphere against human rights defenders and social movements (Kline, 2015). In
the media, guerrilla fighters were depicted as terrorists which dramatically changed the perception of
the conflict (Arnson, 2007). Uribe’s popularity hinged on a hard-line offensive promising to ter-
minate the FARC militarily. However, even though they were weakened, the FARC continued to be
active after 2010.
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In 2002, it was estimated that the FARC had almost 20,000 members; in 2009, that number
reduced to 11,500 (González Muñoz, 2014: 243–262). The FARC’s power mainly began to weaken
after 2007 (Pécaut, 2008: 114). Not only was the FARC’s manpower including their military
capacity decreased, their financial revenues, communication channels and leadership structures were
also weakened (Schreiber, 2010: 247). Many high commanders died in military operations after
2007.Nevertheless, the FARC continued to attack on a broad scale. Until 2005, the number of armed
confrontations did not decrease significantly (Pécaut, 2008: 125). Moreover, the number of ex-
tortions, collective homicides and kidnappings remained the same in 2008 and 2009 (Bermúdez
Liévano, 2018; Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, 2009). After 2008, the FARC renewed its
internal structures and strategies, as such creating a new blog in Guaviare and choosing new
commanders to keep their hierarchical structures functioning (Chernick, 2017: 209–210; Schreiber,
2010: 249) Moreover, they learned to adapt to the state military pressure by attacking on smaller
scales and using anti-personnel landmines (Kline, 2015; Restrepo and Aponte, 2009). The com-
plicated geography made it difficult for the Colombian military to eliminate cocaine exports
completely and to gain state control. In other words, the FARC continued to be financially in-
dependent while acting in a power vacuum (Montenegro, 2006: 109; Richani, 2013: 85; Valencia,
2008). Moreover, the social conditions of the rural population sustained the FARC’s domination in
certain regions and helped the guerrilla recruit new fighters (Chernick, 2017). The FARC thus did
not have the capacity to take over the state, but it continued to be financially independent, flexible
and perseverant.
Taking this into account, a political negotiation was the solution to the conflict. Structural factors
influencing the initiation of peace processes were already present, among them international support,
the state’s relative military strength and a certain dead-end for the FARC (Monteiro Dario, 2014).
This was also recognised by Uribe who had tried to initiate dialogues with the FARC throughout his
presidency since 2003 (Acosta Patiño, 2016: 36; Bermúdez, 2010: 284–287). In public, Uribe
continued his narrative of fighting to the end against the FARC, but the documentation of secret
exchanges between the Uribe government and the FARC in 2009 and 2010 –which occurred without
an agenda – clearly paints a different picture.1 Uribe’s peace talks failed after a year in April 2010
when he publicly gave a speech against the FARC. Before Santos was elected in June 2010, he was
known as a hard-line defence minister under Uribe (2006–2009), leading the heaviest attacks against
the FARC in Colombian history. After his election in 2010, Santos announced that his key agenda
was going to be peacemaking with the FARC. Many Colombians did not expect that he would
become a president with such a strong commitment to resolving the conflict via peace negotiations
(Pachón and Hoskin, 2011: 17–22). Secret peace talks started shortly thereafter, and in 2012, it was
made public that a peace process had started (later ending in an agreement in 2016).
State of the art: Lessons from leadership and conflict negotiation studies
Leadership scholars have continuously claimed that leaders matter for political outcomes, and their
work has found resonance in the profiling of political elites (Leites, 1951, 1953) and US-American
presidents (George, 1967; Greenstein, 1965). However, political science omitted this approach by
concentrating on the structure of the international system (see Byman and Pollack, 2014), thus far
overlooking many contributions seeking to understand political leadership (Barber, 1985; Hermann,
1977). It is only recently that studies on political leaders have experienced a renaissance, going
beyond the general statement that leaders matter somehow. Rather, a recent article in the Annual
Review of Political Science states that ‘personal attributes and life experiences of individual leaders
affect important political outcomes in systematic, predictable ways’ (Krcmaric et al., 2020, also see
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Jervis, 2017). Still, the methods to unpack the black box of political leaders continue to be very
diverse, with little disciplinary consensus; political psychologists and scholars trained in psychology
try to draw generalisations from human cognitive processes to make interferences about political
leaders’ behaviour using experimental methods (Mattes and Weeks, 2019; Rathbun et al., 2017).
However, this approach falls short in understanding leader-specific attributes and experiences.
Another line of research uses content analysis (e.g. Schafer and Walker, 2006) and in this process
there is difficulty of finding access to original data, and country- and culture-specific differences in
language make comparisons difficult. Quantitative scholars such as Horowitz et al. (2015) take
leaders’ biographical data and correlate themwith political outcomes, but questions remain about the
actual causal mechanisms at work when correlating certain biographical experiences with political
outcomes. Others use qualitative methods to analyse biographical data (Jervis, 2017; Saunders,
2011; Tuchman, 1984). Here, the problem lies in the fact that single case studies often cannot
produce attributes and experiences that have systematic and comparable effects. However, new
approaches, like the personal biography approach, seek to systematise the angle to study single-case
biographical data (Krcmaric et al., 2020).
Conflict negotiation literature has often ignored the importance of leadership for the initiation of
peace negotiations. However, there is a wealth of contributions on peace spoilers, defined as actors
who try to destroy peace attempts out of personal fears or interests (Newman and Richmond, 2006;
Stedman, 1997). There are almost no works on political leaders who engage positively in peace
processes (an exception is Lieberfeld, 2018). Peace and conflict scholars have often overlooked the
importance of leadership and focused on ‘the moment of ripeness’ to explain the initiation of peace
negotiations (Pruitt, 2011; Walch, 2016; Walter, 2002; Zartman, 2001). The concept of ‘ripeness’
assumes that both parties in conflict must suffer until the only situation is to initiate a peace process.
The concept was often criticised (e.g. Kleiboer, 1994), but still only a few scholars took a turn to
leadership, even if Zartman himself stated: ‘Ripeness is only one condition, necessary but not
sufficient, for the initiation of negotiations. It is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing – it must be
seized, either directly by the parties or, if not, through the persuasion of a mediator’ (2001: 9). The
scholars who recognised that the initiation of peace negotiations depends on the national executives
still did not focus on the development of leadership (e.g. Kegley and Raymond, 1999: 19). However,
some scholars contributed to the idea that leaders with certain psychological traits are more likely to
engage in a peace process (Aquilar and Galluccio, 2008; Forgas et al., 2011; Suedfeld and Rank,
1976: 171).
Not much has been written on the actual leadership needed for a successful initiation of peace
negotiations. The main contribution to Peace and Conflict studies is that the political leaders in
charge have to be ready to represent a policy of reconciliation to negotiate with the adversaries.
However, they also have to remain careful to appear rather strong in order to keep the support of their
political base (Gormley-Heenan, 2001; Stedman, 1997; Zartman, 2001). This stands in line with
some political psychology contributions on a ‘hawk’s advantage’, meaning that decisions by
hardliners are more accepted than by doves, when it comes to the implementation of unpopular and
new policies (Kertzer et al., 2020; Mattes and Weeks, 2019). Thus, a leadership fruitful for ne-
gotiations has to appear strong for the public and respectful towards the opponents – a middle ground
between hawk and dove.
Literature on Colombia’s peace processes has also not focused on leadership by using changing
regional and internal circumstances as the key variables to explain the trajectories of war and peace
(Cepeda Ulloa, 2016; Chernick, 2017: 208; Jaramillo, 2017; Pizarro Leongómez, 2017: 383–385).
These studies seem to disregard that leadership is important and functional in combination with other
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factors. The few contributions on Santos’ leadership are three non-academic biographies (Duzán,
2018; Granados Morales, 2016; Hernández, 2014).
Ultimately, conflict negotiation literature highlights that a pragmatic and reconciliation-oriented
leadership is necessary to initiate peace negotiations successfully; however, it remains unclear how
this leadership can be developed.
Methodology: A biography approach to leadership for peace processes
The research design begins with the assumption that Juan Manuel Santos developed a leadership
eligible for the successful outcome of Colombia’s peace process. There are three reasons why this is
less problematic than it seems: first, the main focus is the interaction between biographical factors
and leadership. In this case, the observed behaviour is the initiation of a negotiation exploring
Santos’ biographical factors, which laid an important foundation for the successful initiation of the
peace process.
Second, when it comes to negative cases, scholars have hesitated less to draw a connection
between leadership and political outcomes (e.g. on Netanyahu in the Israel/Palestine conflict, see
Aronoff, 2014). Jervis criticises that Leadership studies focus on negative examples, calling for
a more inclusive approach in which positive cases are comprehensively assessed and not treated as
individual incomparable cases (2017: 6). Moreover, in line with other contributions in Leadership
studies (Lieberfeld, 2018), this article follows Greenstein by claiming that leadership matters when
the ‘situation is novel, ambiguous, and with no formal rules’ (1992: 110). During an internal armed
conflict like the Colombian case, where there is significant intergroup violence, there is notable
potential for the leader to make an impact. Moreover, it was a novel situation that the FARC was
significantly weakened (Pizarro Leongómez, 2017).
Third, Santos’ behaviour, even before the peace talks started officially in 2012, illustrates that it
was Santos’ leadership that initiated the process. After his election in 2010, Santos called Frank
Pearl, Uribe’s high commissioner for peace since 2009, asking him to inform him about Uribe’s
secret peace talks. Pearl concluded that the relationship between Uribe and Hugo Chávez, president
of Venezuela, had largely made it impossible to achieve a fruitful dialogue (interview with Frank
Pearl, 2018). Chávez was a key figure for Colombia’s peace process as Venezuela’s socialist project
of Bolivarismo served as a point of reference for the guerrilla groups and because Chávez provided
shelter, arms and other supplies the guerrilla groups needed (Freeman, 2017: 203–216). Thus, Santos
arranged a meeting with Chávez to gain his support despite many personal differences (see Santos’
writings against Chávez, e.g. 2004b). This proactive move reveals that Santos’ behaviour was key
to facilitate the dynamics between the government and the FARC (Acosta Patiño, 2016: 48).
Studying political leaders from a distance is not an easy task (Hermann, 1977; Rhodes and ’t Hart,
2014). This study therefore pays great attentiveness to qualitative sources drawn from memoirs,
biographies, interviews, journalistic accounts, newspaper archives and secondary academic liter-
ature. To explore the link between Santos’ capacity to represent a leadership of pragmatism and
recognition, I adopt the recently developed personal biography approach (Krcmaric et al., 2020)
which differs fundamentally from other strands of leadership research as it actually unpacks the
micro-foundations of political leadership. The idea is to take observable features gathered from
Santos’ biography, which explain his beliefs and values, competence and skills and the perceptions
others have of him, to predict the positive outcome of the last peace process with the FARC. These
three mechanisms are commonly invoked by scholars working in the political leadership vein;
however, it is novel to combine these features in a rigorous manner. The personal biography
approach can be linked to other Leadership studies claiming that a leader’s life story is an important
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source for our understanding of political leadership (Shamir et al., 2005). Providing a rigorous
analysis, this approach explores, step by step, each mechanism and its causal impact on Santos’
leadership potential for peace processes. Coding is the main analytic process in this approach; I
categorised segments of data with a code and used these codes to sort and develop an understanding
of Santos’ leadership. Santos’ biographical factors have been carefully examined by taking a macro
perspective considering secondary sources, a micro perspective looking at archival data and a personal
perspective through interviews and autobiographies. In comparison to the ‘Krcmaric’ approach, the
analysis will not include a section on ‘material interests’ because for Santos the peace process was
neither financially nor electorally rewarding. Coming from a very wealthy family, Santos did not
have any financial gains to make by initiating a peace process. Also, electorally, he lost a large
portion of his political capital during the peace process, as his plunging levels of popular approval
show (Pizarro Leongómez, 2017).
According to the personal biography approach, beliefs and values ‘are shaped by ascriptive
characteristics given at birth and/or socialising life experiences accrued prior to assuming office’
(Krcmaric et al., 2020). This requires a close look at Santos’ family, his education and his military
service, and his career before he went into politics. To do so, I conducted in-depth interviews with
family members and friends who were asked to describe their time with Santos and with Santos
himself who was asked to comment on his beliefs and values. Moreover, qualitative content analysis
is used to examine Santos’ past statements prior to his presidency. Since 1994, as both journalist and
politician, Santos himself has written extensively on Colombia’s conflict which is why his opinion
pieces in the newspaper El Tiempo and his books will be critically examined. I coded this material for
the words: conflict, peace, guerrilla, FARC, defeat and negotiation to grasp the development of his
beliefs and values.
Secondly, Santos’ competence and skills focuses on Santos’ qualities as a leader, which he
developed since he entered politics in 1991 until his presidency in 2010. Biographical factors may
affect a politician’s competence and skills, as for example family connections facilitate the access to
certain work opportunities (Krcmaric et al., 2020). Leaders pay more attention to specific policies
when they have had personal and professional experiences in certain areas (Burden, 2007).
Therefore, the focus lays on Santos’ performance in the different ministries by examining media
reports, military accounts and secondary sources on his competence and skills. To code skills, I
looked at new policies and structures, publicly known problems or scandals, and public statements
by Santos.
Finally, other peoples’ perceptions of leaders are key for the development of peace process, in
which actors have to believe their opponents and voters trust their representatives (Kupchan, 2010;
Larson, 1997). The actors involved in the conflict, such as the insurgents and the military, have to
support or at least recognise the political leader in charge. Biographical factors may affect how other
actors perceive the executives because people make assumptions about their skills, interest and
beliefs based on identifiable features from a leader’s background. These perceptions, in turn, can
indirectly shape leader behaviour (Krcmaric et al., 2020). Also, Leadership scholars have claimed
that the self is constructed through the narrative others develop of the leader (Sparrowe, 2005).
Santos’ biographical factors may have affected how the FARC and the military saw him as a leader.
Methodologically, primary data on their opinions are limited, but still it is possible to analyse
statements from the FARC and the military through secondary sources. Moreover, it is possible to
explore how Santos believed to be seen by these two groups by taking his autobiography and his
interview into account.
Yet, before going into the analysis of the three mechanisms at work to understand Santos’
leadership, two important disclaimers need to be made: Santos’ capacity to combine policies of
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recognition with a certain type of toughness to initiate a peace process heavily depends on the fact
that he is a wealthy man who could easily personify strength and responsibility. Although it is
empirically challenging to isolate the effect of male leadership on conflict resolution, it can be
doubted that a woman would have been equally respected by the military and the FARC. Studies
have shown that leaders’ reconciliatory behaviour is publicly more accepted if the leader in charge
was a hawk and a man (Schultz, 2005). Additionally, so far, no woman has been elected as president
in Colombia. Concerning wealth, it can be assumed that the public relevance and economic power of
the Santos family was a benefit, if not a prerequisite to unite and reconciliate many forces behind his
back to become both, president and a peacemaker.
Santos’ beliefs and values
Firstly, I examine Santos’ childhood and socialisation prior to entering politics, in order to explore
the origins of his leadership. This requires a close look at Santos’ family, his education, military
service and career before he went into politics in 1991. Most importantly, I examine the beliefs and
values dominating his journalistic contributions from 1994–2006.2
Santos was born in 1951 into an influential family in Colombia. Their public relevance was most
notable from 1913 when Eduardo Santos Montejo (President of Colombia from 1938 to 1942),
Santos great-uncle, purchased El Tiempo, which in the next two decades became a leading national
newspaper. With his three brothers, Santos grew up in a predominant liberal household in a wealthy
neighbourhood of Bogotá (Santos Calderón, 2018: 24). Santos’ relationship with his father was very
close (López Michelsen, 1993: 76–87), and he was portrayed as an ideal son who did not cause any
problems (interview with with Santos’ step-cousin Enrique Santos Molano, 2018).3 Santos’ mother
Clemencia believed strongly in liberal and Catholic values (Santos Calderón, 2018: 22–23). At
home, politics were discussed daily, and politicians walked in and out; however, no Santos family
member was expected to enter politics based on the principles Eduardo Santos had established El
Tiempo. This is a key aspect to consider because it shows that Santos became involved in politics
against the family rule. His brother Enrique, who published his memoirs in 2018, describes the
atmosphere at home: ‘The order of things was the country, the newspaper and then the family’
(Santos Calderón, 2018: 35). Santos considered his family background as relevant to his governing
behaviour because he developed the belief that Colombia’s destiny mattered and needed to be
changed (interview with Santos Calderón, 2018).4
Santos’ first step towards a career in the public sector started with his decision to join the navy as
a cadet when he was only 16 years old. In many speeches, he mentioned that this was a key
experience for his socialisation, as he learned that problems can be solved (Abbott, 2018). In 1973, at
only 22 years of age, he received his first job with the National Federation of Coffee Growers of
Colombia as the chief executive to the International Coffee Organization (ICO) in London, thanks to
Arturo Gómez Jaramillo, the director of the federation (1958–1982) whom he called his second
father (Santos Calderón, 1999e). According to Santos’ life-long friend Osorio, a Colombian
diplomat, who spent many years with Santos in London working for the ICO, their jobs taught them
the arts of diplomacy (interview with Néstor Osorio Londoño, 2018).5 Those years in London were
of great importance for Santos’ professional career as he strengthened connections with Colombian
politicians and diplomats (Hernández, 2014: 81).
Back in Colombia, his next step was the family newspaper El Tiempo in 1982. In comparison to
his brothers and cousins, Santos did not start working there in a low-level position. Instead his father
directly nominated him as subdirector of the newspaper. Such a position of power at a young age
within the family business influenced both Santos himself and his relationship with other family
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members (Santos Calderón, 2013: 56–57). In 1986, he was already a close friend of Gabriel Silva
Luján, a national security advisor of President Virgilio Barco (1986–1990) working on a peace
negotiation with the FARC. If Silva is to be believed, Santos had already begun developing an
interest in peace negotiations in the 1980s.6
His professional career and his family background already give an insight into the development of
Santos’ beliefs and values. However, his writings (1994–2006) shed more light about his beliefs and
values concerning war and peace. Between his adolescence and his election as president, he authored
a significant number of books and opinion pieces for the press, which offer a unique source to
explore the development of his thinking.
In 1994, Santos published, Colombia sin fronteras, a book, in which he elaborated the idea that
achieving peace should be Colombia’s main goal for its own development (1994: 363). Between
1996 and 1997, he established a political project under the banner Destino Colombia. Its content is
relevant for the analysis of Santos’ beliefs and values. It shows what Santos wanted to achieve:
recognition of the constitution by all parties involved in the conflict, a mutual ceasefire, support from
the international community and the establishment of a demilitarised zone for starting the dialogues
(Fundación Buen Gobierno, 1997; Santos Calderón, 1997c, 1998). In 1997, Santos also depicted the
country as divided, in which every citizen had the duty to make his or her contribution to end the
conflict as soon as possible (1997a). Santos went even further by stating that, if the conflict was
finally to be solved, a new country needed to be constructed instead of only incorporating the
insurgents into the political system (1998). He frequently repeated this view by claiming that
Colombia needed an inclusive peace agreement which would transform society. Around that time,
much of his thinking developed around the ‘third way’, a political position akin to centrism de-
veloped by sociologist Anthony Giddens. Santos was very fond of the idea and even wrote a book
together with British Prime Minister Tony Blair about how to introduce this concept to Colombia
(1999). Blair and Jonathan Powell, British diplomat, significantly influenced Santos’ beliefs about
conflict negotiation when they were working on the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland
(Abbott, 2018).
In his writings, he also made specific references to the FARC: He stated that it was crucial to
understand the other side and to see the conflict from different perspectives, which is why he tried to
put himself in the position of ‘Marulanda’, the main leader of the FARC (1999a). At the same time, it
cannot be denied that Santos kept a very neutral and respectful tone when writing about the FARC
and the ELN. Until 2005, he did not once use the term ‘terrorists’ to refer to them, and even during
the Pastrana peace process he did not accuse the FARC of destroying the dialogues (2005b).
Additionally, Santos considered South Africa’s, Sri Lanka’s and Northern Ireland’s experiences and
the importance of international advisors like Kahane (1996b). However, at the same time, he
believed that ‘with force it is necessary to conquer peace’ (1994: 365). Santos here recognised
a political negotiation as the best path for Colombia, but that he also understood that the main
condition for the success of a negotiation is that plan B, meaning military defeat, is actually a threat
for the guerrillas (1999c). For Santos, it would be impossible to negotiate with the guerrilla groups if
they did not fear the state’s power (1996b). Nevertheless, he clearly rejected a military defeat as
a justified solution to the conflict and even called it a ‘perverse’ suggestion considering that the
exclusion of certain social groups had caused violence (1996c).
His aversion towards a non-negotiated solution was also made explicit when he wrote: ‘The
country is confronted with a devilish paradox, in which to construct peace one turns to violence’
(1999b). Thus, he expressed his firm commitment to a negotiated solution when Pastrana initiated
his peace process (1999d). In 2003, he stated that, according to his conviction, a political negotiation
should always be preferred (2003: 5). However, 2 years later, when the political climate was in
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favour of Uribe’s national security policy, he stated that this path had to be continued because it was
necessary and suitable for Colombia at that moment (2005d). Still, Santos continued to mention
a political solution to the conflict in his articles, and in 2005, he invited experts like Shlomo Ben
Ami, an Israeli politician, diplomat and peace negotiator, to Colombia (2005c).
This section showed how important Colombia’s future was for Santos’ leadership development;
at home, liberal values were transmitted; at work, Santos focused on diplomacy, and in his writings,
it becomes apparent how Santos’ values and beliefs formed around solving Colombia’s internal
conflict. Thus, it was predictable that he would become a reconciliation-oriented leader and it can be
assumed that his success in the peace process depended on his deeply rooted belief that peace needed
to be achieved.
Santos’ competence and skills
The first section showed that even before entering politics, Santos’ family connection gave him
access to certain work opportunities. Santos belonged to a closely knit and highly influential family,
and the name ‘Santos’ had a significant impact on Colombian politics. These biographical factors
directly affected the formation of his competences and skills from 1991 to 2010 when he became
president. Early on Santos had the chance to prove his expertise in different political projects and
ministries. Mainly, his last position as minister of defence (2006–2009) gives an insight into his
skills development.
President César Gaviria was the first one who had a positive opinion of young Santos offering him
the position as minister of foreign trade from 1991 until 1994 in a newly founded ministry. In this
position, Santos worked effectively on expanding Colombia’s international trade and opening up the
economy. Paying attention to economic issues made sense given his experience in the coffee sector.
In 1995, when accusations became public that President Ernesto Samper’s campaign had partially
been funded with drug money, Santos soon became a strong opponent of the Samper government
(1994–1998), demanding his resignation (1996a). During the scandal, Santos developed further
political competence when he founded his already mentioned project Destino Colombia, a peace
initiative to bring the Colombian conflict to an end putting together different sectors of Colombia’s
society from guerrilleros to paramilitaries and from representatives of the church to businessmen.
His diplomacy improved by organising several meetings for Destino Colombia, and he even met
with FARC commander ‘Raúl Reyes’ in Costa Rica in 1997 to gain his support (Corral, 2016: 21–
24; Hernández, 2014: 107–113). However, one aspect of the initiative was to call for a national
constituent assembly without informing President Samper. Soon the government denounced the
initiative as a conspiracy against Samper, as it seemed that Santos sought to negotiate a peace process
under the condition that it would not materialise under the ‘illegitimate’ Samper government. It was
highly debated as to whether or not this was a condition imposed by Santos, the FARC or the
paramilitaries (Aranguren Molina, 2001: 287). Santos was accused of doing this to promote his own
presidency, which forced him to withdraw his pre-candidacy in 1998 while the peace initiative lost
its drive andmeaning (Santos Calderón, 1997: 374). It is important to note that his election manifesto
during this short campaign was to achieve a political negotiation with the FARC (El Tiempo, 2016).
Conspiracy or not, it is clear that organising these events without including the president was an idea
doomed to fail. This experience probably made Santos understand that he had to be more pragmatic
by pronouncing his plans.
When Pastrana was elected in 1998, he asked Santos to form a commission aimed at establishing
a demilitarised zone to negotiate a peace process with the FARC (León, 2018). However, Santos
soon left the commission criticising its lack of organisation, structure and objectives through his
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foundation Buen Gobierno and in his opinion pieces in El Tiempo (1997b). In his view, any peace
process needed a clear definition of what kind of peace was to be achieved (Señal Memoria, 1999).
The FARC quickly lost interest in the peace process with Pastrana and abused his extreme con-
cessions to actually strengthen their fighting capacities. This first-hand experience in a peace process
introduced Santos to the challenges of making concessions. He learned that concessions had to be
made, but with strength and caution to achieve a political agreement (interview with Santos
Calderón, 2018).
In 2002, Uribe was elected as the new president. Santos did not support his candidacy and became
a strong critic of Uribe’s style of governing (Santos Calderón, 2004a). In 2004, Uribe nominated
Santos as the leader of the governing party in congress. This can only be explained by the fact that
Uribe needed Santos to strengthen his government. Santos had a name that the Bogotá elites and
politicians respected, and he had the skills to organise and convince different sectors to work with
Uribe. Santos’ failure to become mayor of Bogotá in 2003, and Uribe’s extremely high approval
rates might explain why Santos engaged increasingly in Uribe’s political agenda (Santos, 2005a).
Also, it must have inspired Santos that one of his ex-professors wrote a novel in 2003, in which
Santos would be the president of Colombia in 2020 (Fuentes, 2003: 49). In 2005, Santos decided to
support Uribe by founding the U Party (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional), which became the
political platform on which basis Uribe got re-elected in 2006. Shortly after Uribe’s re-election,
Santos stepped down from his leading position of the party and became minister of defence. Minister
of defence was a key position, since security was the flagship of Uribe’s government and it was seen
by many Colombians as the most important political position after the presidency. Santos’ trajectory
under Uribe needs to be seen as a strategic and pragmatic adaptation to the political circumstances of
someone who understood that there was no political future without Uribe. In the past, he had learned
that being too open about his preferences towards peace negotiations without the president’s
knowledge was not effective, and in a political atmosphere that favoured Uribe’s policies, Santos
took the opportunities that Uribe offered him.
In Santos’ last position before the presidency, as defence minister from July 2006 toMay 2009, he
gained further skills. Firstly, he knew how to break up old structures in the military in order to
improve them (Deas, 2015; Pécaut, 2008: 65; Valencia, 2008). This is a key leadership skill in
protracted conflicts as it is often the military which cannot adapt to new agendas (Chernick, 1999:
52). Another example is Santos’ suggestion of Óscar Naranjo as new general director of the national
police in 2007 which made the national police more effective, transparent and cooperative. Still,
many problems of the security sector persisted (Grabendorff, 2009: 83).
Secondly, Santos learned how to deal with a highly sensible issue by blaming others, changing
the discourse and escaping responsibility (La Silla Vacı́a, 2010). Santos had a very controversial role
in the case of the ‘false positives’, which was a scandal evolving around extrajudicial killings of
Colombian citizens by members of the military in 2008. The victims, mostly young, mentally
challenged or poor men from the countryside, were registered as guerrillas killed in combat. Despite
the scandal, Santos knew how to keep his position as minister, not stepping back, and becoming
famous for some strong measurements against human rights violators. As such, 27 military officials
had to leave the army, including three generals (Fiscalı́a General de la Nación, 2009: 20).
Third, Santos knew how to model his reputation in the media. Most of Santos’ fame as hard-line
defence minister comes from the fact that he was the one who announced the successful operations to
the press. Moreover, Santos made it seem that he was responsible for authorising the operations
without Uribe’s direct permission but with his unspoken consent (Semana, 2008). One major success
was operation Jaque in July 2008, which resulted in the successful rescue of 15 hostages, including
former presidential candidate Íngrid Betancourt (Torres Cuéllar, 2008: 28–32; Villamarin Pulido,
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2009). The media reportage of operation Jaque made Colombia’s public think that the FARC had
significantly been weakened and that the army was gaining the upper hand thanks to Santos (Becerra
Gómez and Burgos Suárez, 2018). Not only in the news, but also in his book, Jaque al terror, Santos
presented himself as the strong decision maker through using an aggressive language against the
FARC and by choosing pictures of him with rescued hostages, military generals and dead FARC
members (2009: 42). At the same time, Santos was pragmatic enough not to humiliate the FARC in
public speeches. Mostly, he congratulated the national army without mentioning that the operation
deceived the FARC nor by calling them terrorists. His presidential campaign was also characterised
by pragmatism (Taylor, 2016: 184). In 2009, 57% of the electorate claimed they would re-elect Uribe
again if possible, whereas Santos himself only got a 4% approval rate (Ipsos Napoleón Franco, 2009:
35). Considering these approval rates, the only way to become president was through standing for
a continuity of Uribe’s policies. Therefore, nothing indicated that Santos would start a dialogue with
the FARC before his actual election in June 2010.
This section showed that Santos developed very pragmatic skills from 1991 to 2010 with the
competence to organise, solve constraints and represent himself in a positive light with different
actors, keeping his doors open and gaining political support. Of course, Santos’ pragmatism can be
seen as a perfection of opportunism and as a lack of consistency. However, this does not change the
fact that he embodied many leadership qualities needed to unite many different sectors of Co-
lombia’s society, a key pre-requisite for conflict resolution.
Others’ perceptions of Santos
This last section explores the FARC’s and the military’s perceptions of Santos, which in turn,
indirectly shaped Santos’ behaviour. At the end of 2008, the FARC found itself in a new position:
they were not only significantly weakened in terms of numbers, but the military pressure increased as
leadership changes occurred in a new generation of FARC commanders. . This was a significant shift
because the leadership changed from a top of old guerrilleros keeping hold of a decentralised
organisation to a group of leaders who envisioned a future in politics (Pizarro Leongómez, 2017:
370; Taylor, 2016: 183). How did the FARC view Santos at that time? Of course, data are very
limited, but it can be assumed that they saw him as a possible negotiation partner based on the fact
that ‘Alfonso Cano’, commander of the FARC between 2008 and 2011, even produced a video
1 week before Santos’ inauguration offering peace dialogues (Al-Jazeera, 2010). Based on his
predisposition towards a political negotiation, Santos interpreted the FARC’s actions as a chance for
a fruitful dialogue (interview with Santos Calderón, 2018). Another political leader could have
exploited their weaknesses, ignored their offer or advocated for increasing military pressure.
Moreover, the FARC had always maintained a positive opinion of Santos’ brother Enrique, a rather
leftist journalist (Santos Calderón, 2014: 19–21). Additionally, Santos’ biographical factors (mainly
the fact that someone from the highest Colombian elite had always tried to work on possible
negotiations) caught their attention (‘Timochenko’ in El Colombiano, 2019). It is also reported that
the FARC respected Santos as a military man because he had been an effective defence minister and
had military training (Kline, 2015: 89; Santos Calderón, 2019: 164, 193). They were impressed by
the efficacy of the attacks and valued the fact that he treated them as insurgents and not as terrorists
(Acosta Patiño, 2016: 48).
Most army commanders highly respected Santos as defence minister, not only because he led the
heaviest attacks against the FARC, but also because he made the military apparatus more transparent
and efficient (Pizarro Leongómez, 2018; Torres Cuéllar, 2008; Villamarin Pulido, 2009). Fur-
thermore, Santos’ strong approach against the ones responsible for the ‘false positives’ brought him
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notable recognition in the army ranks as a man who understood that this scandal was very bad for
their reputation (Pizarro Leongómez, 2018). It might have also influenced the military’s perception
of Santos. He joined the navy as a cadet, when he was still a student, and most high-level politicians
do not choose to join the army, (see Pastrana’s and Uribe’s biographies). The respect for Santos’
leadership made it possible that Sergio Jaramillo, Santos’ closest work partner and his vice-minister
of defence, could develop a new way of thinking about conflict resolution, which was accepted by
the military (Gómez Giraldo, 2016: 26). In past peace attempts, the military had feared that their
political power would be reduced, as such President Belisario Betancur’s (1982–1986) peace
process failed due to resistance of the military and the traditional political elites (Martı́n Medem,
2016: 260; Pizarro Leongómez, 2018). Consequently, the fact that many generals saw a peace
negotiation as the victory and not the end for the Colombian army was a decisive step for the
outcome of any dialogue. Secondly, some military branches developed a new understanding of
human rights and of the genesis of the conflict, although there is no shared military version of the
conflict (Pizarro Leongómez, 2018). Based on these observations, Santos could count on the military
support for his plans to negotiate (interview with Santos Calderón, 2018).
Lastly, it is important to compare this to the FARC’s and the military’s perceptions of Pastrana and
Uribe. Pastrana’s peace process with the FARC (1999–2002) could never embark on suitable
conditions, as the Colombian army did not have the military capacity to put some pressure on the
FARC. Moreover, Pastrana’s leadership seemed weak as he offered concessions to the guerrilla
without expecting anything in return (Kline, 2007: 52). Pastrana’s example shows that being
reconciliation-oriented is not enough, as this can be interpreted as a weakness by the opponents.
Additionally, the military did not see Pastrana as a strong leader and were sceptical about his
decision towards establishing a demilitarised zone for starting the dialogues (Kline, 2007: 54; Martı́n
Medem, 2016: 260; Pizarro Leongómez, 2018; Richani, 2013: 35–49). On the contrary, Uribe had
much military support and many external conditions were eligible for negotiations. Mainly, the
FARC’s position had changed: As such in April 2010, before Santos came to power the FARC
lamented in an open letter to Pearl that Uribe had decided to finish the talks with them before they
even properly started, claiming that their doors would remain open (FARC-EP, 2010).
There are several reasons why Uribe missed the conditions for a peace process. Firstly, Uribe
might have still felt bitterness for the death of his father, who had been allegedly killed by the FARC
in 1983 (Kline, 2015: 95–97). Secondly, the FARC did not see any coherence in Uribe’s actions: On
one side, he continued to attack them verbally, and on the other, he showed them his goodwill
towards dialogue by releasing some FARC prisoners (Bermúdez Liévano, 2018: 31). Thirdly, Uribe
himself saw the fault clearly with the FARC who, according to him, had no genuine interest in
negotiations and abused his concessions (Uribe Velez, 2012). Thus, scholars like Kline described
Uribe’s negotiation attempts in 2009 and 2010 as ‘paradoxical peace non-processes’ (2015: 89).
Fourthly, personal animosities between Uribe and the presidents of Ecuador and Venezuela made
any effective peace initiative in his two administration periods difficult. Thus, his leadership style
was not suitable for the development of peace initiatives and his personal issues with the FARC and
other presidents could not be combined with a convincing peace policy. Despite Uribe’s popularity,
it can be doubted that he could have personified a reconciliation-oriented leadership style.
This last section showed that the FARC perceived Santos as a strong leader who respected them
and was ready to commit himself to ending the conflict. On the other side, Santos could count on the
military’s support because they saw him as a trustworthy and pragmatic military man who would not
let himself be fooled by the FARC. Being and feeling accepted and respected by the two main actors
of the conflict was a key factor for the initiation of a successful peace process.
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Conclusions
This article argues that Colombian President Santos developed a leadership between hawk and
dove – and that this was possible due to crucial factors residing in his biography.7 Linking this
leadership-centred argument with findings from the conflict negotiation suggests that a pragmatic
and reconciliation-oriented leadership might be relevant to find solutions to protracted conflicts like
the one in Colombia.
Adopting the recently developed personal biography approach, I explored Colombian President
Santos’ beliefs and values, his competence and skills and others’ perceptions of him. Based on
qualitative sources, it became obvious that the concept of reconciliation was both formative and
central in Santos’ belief system. His skills and competence were highly influenced by the fact that the
name ‘Santos’ gave him access to political power. However, he also adapted to the political climate
under earlier President Uribe, which officially excluded a negotiated solution to the conflict and
waited until he was elected as president to promote his ideals to resolve the conflict. In the meantime,
he left the doors open, did not humiliate the FARC and yet also gained respect from the military
apparatus by leading the heaviest attacks against the FARC, presenting the successful operations as
his achievement. Santos was perceived as a potential negotiator, and simultaneously he treated
others as potential negotiating partners and peace supporters.
Still, Santos remains a controversial figure and it needs to be clear that a leadership between hawk
and dove might only be fruitful for the initiation of a peace process. Santos’ leadership could not
prevent that the implementation of the peace process faced many difficulties. Moreover, it is still
debated if Santos’main motivation for initiating a peace process was his wish to ‘go down in history’
as a peacemaker. Further studies need to explore if this was a unique Santos’ feature or rather
a common desire shared by all political leaders. More studies should broaden the link between
structural factors, biographical factors and character traits, as it is still unclear how exactly ex-
periences shape personality (Horowitz and Fuhrmann, 2018). It would also be interesting to find
experimental evidence for pragmatism and orientation towards reconciliation as key variables for
understanding decision-making in peace scenarios, contributing to recent studies on hawks’ ad-
vantage to pursue rapprochement (Mattes and Weeks, 2019). Moreover, this study claims that
a policy of reconciliation is not enough (contrarily to Lieberfeld, 2018), which invites further
qualitative case comparisons of leaders in peace processes.
This analysis contributes to the idea that leaders’ biographical factors are relevant for political
developments. It shows that the explanatory power of ‘ripeness’, which has so often been used in
conflict negotiation literature, is incomplete when leaders are left out. It also indicates that a dis-
tinction between hawks and doves is not fruitful for Peace and Conflict studies. As humans subject to
change, leaders are not empty black boxes but have varying potentials to act according to certain
biographical factors combined with other, often structural factors and process dynamics. Put dif-
ferently, human subjectivity and leadership capacities are central to our understanding of peace and
conflict decisions, which implies that studying the individuals involved in political processes should
be seen as a counterweight, though not replacement, for institutional and structural theories.
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Notes
1. Author’s interview with Frank Pearl, High Commissioner for Peace, Bogotá, 22 August 2018.
2. Note that Santos did not publish any contributions in El Tiempo as minister of foreign trade under Gaviria
(1991–1994), as minister of finance under Pastrana (2000–2003), and as minister of defence under Uribe
(2006–2009).
3. Author’s interview with Enrique Santos Molano, Santos’ step-cousin, Bogotá, 18 August 2018.
4. Author’s interview with Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, Oxford, 13 November 2018.
5. Author’s interview with Néstor Osorio Londoño, diplomat, London, 3 December 2018.
6. Author’s interview with Gabriel Silva Luján, politician, Bogotá, 21 August 2018.
7. For a contrary view claiming that Santos was more a hawk see McNeish, 2015.
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Fuentes C (2003) La Silla Del Águila. Buenos Aires: Alfaguara.
Fundación Buen Gobierno (1997) Destino Colombia. Hacı́a el nuevo milenio. Proceso de Planeación por
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Tuchman B (1984) The March of Folly From Troy to Vietnam. New York: Knopf.
Uribe Velez A (2012) No Hay Causa Perdida. New York: Penguin Group.
Valencia L (2008) Escenarios de la guerra o paz. Arcanos 14(11): 1–3.
Villamarin Pulido LA (2009) Operación Jaque. Bogotá: Luis Villamarin.
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